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General and complete disarmament

Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities

Report of the Secretary-General

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* A/64/50.

I. Introduction

1. In paragraph 2 of its resolution 63/68, on transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities, the General Assembly invited all Member States to submit to the Secretary-General concrete proposals on international outer space transparency and confidence-building measures in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

2. On 11 February 2009, a note verbale was sent to all Member States drawing their attention to paragraph 2 of resolution 63/68 and seeking relevant information on the issues outlined above. The replies received from Argentina, Colombia, Cuba, Czech Republic (on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the European Union), Lebanon, Mexico, Nicaragua, Qatar, Syria and Ukraine are reproduced in section II below. Additional replies received will be issued as addenda to the present report.

II. Replies received from Governments

Argentina

[Original: Spanish]
[28 May 2009]

1. General Assembly resolution 63/68 on transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities invited Member States to submit concrete proposals on international outer space transparency and confidence-building measures in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

2. The preliminary comments of the Argentine Republic in the matter are as follows:

(a) The Argentine Republic is of the view that the legal system has proven incapable of averting the danger of the militarization of outer space;

(b) It believes that, as a first step, progress must be made in adopting transparency and confidence-building measures as a significant contribution to creating an atmosphere of understanding and cooperation that will help prevent an arms race in outer space;

(c) The process of updating the principles of satellite-based remote sensing of the Earth should begin. The existing principles, which were adopted by a resolution of the General Assembly in 1986, are no longer suited to the present situation. It should be noted, in particular, that those principles contain provisions that do not give developing countries access to the information gathered. Part of the updating process could be to consider establishing the programme of the United Nations Platform for Space-based Information for Disaster Management and Emergency Response, which was considered by the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space;

(d) Furthermore, it would be advisable for negotiations to be undertaken in the Conference on Disarmament — the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum — on an international legal instrument banning the deployment of weapons in outer space. Such an instrument would have substantial scope and significance as the outcome of negotiations between the parties; furthermore, its adoption would confirm the will of the international community to avoid an arms race in outer space. Argentina supports the proposal by the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China to negotiate, in the Conference on Disarmament, a treaty on a space weapons ban;

(e) Establishment of unilateral, bilateral, regional and global mechanisms for the provision of information in order to give transparency to space programmes being carried out by States. This could include inviting observers to launches of space objects, demonstrating space technologies and rockets, notification of space vehicle launches and manoeuvres, etc.;

(f) To that end, the General Assembly could set up a Group of Governmental Experts on outer space confidence-building measures to establish the scope, focus and terms of reference for the establishment under the United Nations of a mechanism, system or unified voluntary registry of space activities, including notifications. The Group's work could be based on the relevant existing treaties, codes, principles and global or regional initiatives including, for example, the mechanism for annual reporting under the Hague Code of Conduct on the launching of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles.

Colombia

[Original: Spanish]

[29 May 2009]

Statement of problem

1. Currently, the activities that can take place in outer space help to improve the quality of human life through the establishment of operational communications, weather forecasting, disaster early warning, environmental monitoring, distance education and global navigation satellite systems, among other things.

2. The United Nations promotes the creation of regulatory mechanisms to ensure that all of those activities are carried out solely for peaceful purposes "by all countries regardless of their degree of economic or scientific development, without detriment to the security of any State, and in keeping with the spirit, intent and purpose of the treaty containing the principles governing activities involving the uses of outer space".

3. The General Assembly created the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which comprises 61 Member States and coordinates the activities of the United Nations in that area.

4. Nevertheless, the international community is concerned about outer space activities that may involve the deployment of military systems, which could unleash an arms race, and the use of nuclear power sources in outer space. This situation is a reality because the legal system that applies to outer space is insufficient to guarantee its non-militarization.

5. These activities have undermined confidence in matters of outer space and are conducive to an arms race in space. That being the case, the consequences for the safety of the human race could be incalculable, since development and the free exploration and peaceful use of space may be affected.

Proposals on outer space confidence-building activities

6. As a consequence of the foregoing, international outer space transparency and confidence-building measures are necessary to ensure peace of mind for the international community. We therefore propose:

(a) Developing a mechanism whereby States periodically submit reports on the activities they are undertaking in outer space and the reasons for them;

(b) Creating a mechanism whereby States' activities in outer space can be verified;

(c) Finally, it is important to consider creating, with the help of international cooperation, a specially designed system for the detection and management of space debris.

Cuba

[Original: Spanish]

[2 July 2009]

1. The General Assembly, by its resolution 63/68, invited all Member States to continue to submit to the Secretary-General concrete proposals on international outer space transparency and confidence-building measures in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In response to this invitation, the Government of Cuba wishes to convey the following considerations.

2. It was quite some time ago that the prevention of an arms race in outer space gave way to expressions of global concern about the grave danger to international peace and security that such an arms race would represent. As a consequence, the international community has established a number of legal instruments for that purpose, including the Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963), the Treaty on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (1967) and the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1979).

3. Those instruments have played a positive role in promoting the peaceful use of outer space and in regulating space activities. They have also been important in prohibiting the deployment of weapons of mass destruction and certain military activities in outer space.

4. Cuba supports the efforts being made in that respect by the General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament, in particular the negotiation in the Conference of an international legal instrument banning the deployment of weapons in outer space, and to that end it favours the urgent establishment of a special committee to start the negotiations. General Assembly resolution 63/68 is a very important contribution to the efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space.

5. At the recent Ministerial Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Countries held in Havana in April 2009, Heads of State or Government expressed their concern about the negative consequences of developing and deploying anti-ballistic missile defence systems and seeking advanced military technologies that can be deployed in outer space, which could unleash an arms race and lead to the development of advanced missile systems and the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

6. Current international events are demonstrating, however, that these treaties are no longer enough to prevent the deployment of weapons in space. Unfortunately, a considerable number of objects now located in outer space are not intended to solve the problems of humankind but are instead being used for military or espionage purposes and are adding to the generation of space debris. This is one of the main problems we are currently facing in outer space.

7. Last year, we witnessed the official submission to the Conference on Disarmament, in Geneva, of a joint initiative by the Governments of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China consisting of a draft treaty for a ban on weapons in outer space. This initiative, which has gained the support of various countries, seeks to ban not only space-based arms development, but also the use of force against satellites or any other type of space object.

8. Cuba reiterates that this is a concrete measure in the interest of maintaining international peace and security in outer space activities whose realization will require the support of the international community. Nevertheless, it is opposed by countries such as the United States of America, which has not given up plans for its anti-missile shield programme, which includes elements ranging from laser cannon to anti-satellite missiles.

9. Transparency and confidence-building measures are no substitute for arms control and disarmament measures, nor are they a precondition for implementation of the latter. Nonetheless, they can facilitate the implementation of disarmament agreements and arms verification. Measures could include:

- Convening an international conference to analyse strict compliance with existing agreements on the peaceful uses of outer space
- A review of the current legal system governing activities in outer space in the light of technological advances, which has been permanently blocked by some States in the Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
- Adoption of multilateral agreements for the exchange of information related to the use of outer space
- Development of international cooperation mechanisms that guarantee all countries equal access to the benefits of the peaceful uses of outer space
- Exchange of information on States' main policy directions on outer space, major space research programmes and programmes for the use of outer space, and the orbital parameters of space objects
- Inviting observers to launches of space objects, on a voluntary basis
- Demonstration of space technologies and rockets

- Notification of scheduled launches of space vehicles, planned space manoeuvres that may come dangerously close to the space vehicles of other States and the re-entry of guided space vehicles from orbit into the atmosphere
- Consultations to clarify information provided on research programmes and programmes for the use of outer space, on ambiguous situations and on other matters of concern and to examine the implementation of the transparency and confidence-building measures agreed upon for space-based activities

10. With respect to the use of nuclear power sources in outer space, which is also a matter of international concern, Cuba believes that until the safety framework is sufficiently clear and progress has been made towards more concrete agreements in that respect, this activity should be restricted as far as possible. This limited use should be accompanied by full and transparent information to other States explaining what measures have been taken to guarantee safety.

11. Transparency and confidence-building measures can play an important role in the drafting, approval and implementation of a new treaty banning the deployment of weapons in outer space and the use or threat of force against space objects. They will also help create favourable conditions for the conclusion of a new agreement.

Czech Republic (on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations that are members of the European Union)

[Original: English]

[28 May 2009]

Introductory note

1. The European Union considers that in the context of expanding space activities that contribute to the development of nations, it is important to improve their security and the security of objects in space. The European Union continues to attach great importance to this issue and is committed to the development and implementation of transparency and confidence-building measures for the peaceful and secure use of outer space. The unprecedented collision between two satellites that occurred in the beginning of February 2009 clearly proved the usefulness of the pragmatic and concrete approach adopted by the European Union.

2. The European Union attaches great importance to the relevant existing agreements on outer space activities, which already provide a wide range of transparency and confidence-building measures, and sees them as the basis on which we should build upon.

3. The European Union voted in favour of General Assembly resolutions 61/75, 62/43 and 63/68 on transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities. The broad support garnered by these resolutions confirmed the importance of establishing a voluntary regime encompassing transparency and confidence-building measures based, inter alia, on the following principles:

- (a) Freedom for all to use outer space for peaceful purposes;
- (b) Preservation of the security and integrity of space objects in orbit;

(c) Due consideration for the legitimate security and defence interests of States.

4. The European Union also recognizes the work of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. The Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines endorsed by the Committee in June 2007 and by the General Assembly in its resolution 62/217 are useful contributions to the preservation of the space environment. They are fully conformable with the aims of the European Union plan for a code of conduct for outer space activities.

5. The European Union also supports the initiative aimed at guaranteeing the long-term sustainability of space activities presented to the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space as a proposed new agenda item. The continued involvement of numerous States as well as commercial operators and relevant international organizations reflects the interest in and importance that they attach to the search for concrete measures to strengthen the security of outer space activities. This initiative is fully consistent with and complementary to the European Union plan for a draft code of conduct for outer space activities. The European Union supports that, at the June 2009 main Committee meeting, the long-term sustainability of space activities be formally added to the 2010 agenda of the Committee's Scientific and Technical Subcommittee.

6. In the European context, a European code of conduct for space debris mitigation was adopted in 2004, aimed at reducing the generation of debris in outer space. Furthermore, the European Union adopted the European Space Policy, which is aimed at developing better coordination among the European Union, the European Space Agency and their member States.

Draft code of conduct for outer space activities

7. Following the joint reply to resolution 61/75, in which the European Union expressed its intention to propose a code of conduct on space objects and space activities, the European Union developed, at the expert level, a draft code of conduct for outer space activities, which was supported by the Council of the European Union on 8 and 9 December 2008.

8. The European Union believes that a voluntary code of conduct, which is not legally binding, will strengthen safety, security and predictability of activities in outer space, among other things by limiting or minimizing harmful interference, collisions or accidents in outer space.

9. The draft code of conduct for outer space activities is based on the three main principles mentioned above (see para. 3) that should guide space activities.

10. The draft code of conduct is applicable to all outer space activities conducted by States or non-governmental entities, including the activities carried out within the framework of international intergovernmental organizations. It covers civil as well as military outer space activities.

11. The draft code of conduct calls for progress towards adherence to, and implementation of, the existing United Nations treaties, principles and other arrangements, as the subscribing parties would commit to complying with them, to making progress towards adherence to them, to implementing them, and to promoting their universality.

12. The draft code of conduct complements the existing framework by codifying new and innovative best practices in space operations, including notification, consultation, investigation and information mechanisms that would strengthen the confidence and transparency between space actors; it will then contribute to developing good faith solutions that would permit the performance of space activities and access to space for all. According to the draft code, the subscribing States will implement, inter alia, the following confidence-building measures:

(a) In order to minimize the possibility of accidents in space, collisions between space objects or any form of harmful interference with other States' right to the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, the subscribing States will establish and implement national policies and procedures and will take appropriate steps to minimize the mentioned risks;

(b) In order to limit the creation of space debris and reduce its impact in outer space, the subscribing States will implement the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space endorsed by General Assembly resolution 62/217;

(c) In order to prevent accidents and collisions between space objects, the subscribing States will share information on national space policies on an annual basis. They will commit to notifying in a timely manner, the scheduled manoeuvres; relevant orbital parameters; collisions or accidents; and objects with significant risk of re-entry into the atmosphere or of orbital collision. They will also create a central point of contact and an electronic database;

(d) Moreover, the subscribing States will create a consultation mechanism to achieve acceptable solutions in case of existing reasons to believe that certain space activities are contrary to the purpose of the draft code.

13. The code of conduct will lay down the basic rules to be observed by spacefaring nations in both civil and military space activities; however, it does not include any provisions concerning the placement of weapons in outer space. The purpose of the draft code is not to duplicate or compete with initiatives already dealing with this issue. Nonetheless, as a transparency and confidence-building instrument, the draft does insist, inter alia, on the importance of taking all measures in order to prevent space from becoming an area of conflict and calls on nations to resolve any conflict in outer space by peaceful means.

Participation in the code of conduct for outer space activities

14. The aim of the authors is to reach soon a text that is acceptable to the greatest number of countries and can thus bring effective security benefits in a relatively short term. For this purpose, the European Union launched consultations with the countries, which have activities or interests in outer space.

15. At the end of the aforesaid process, the European Union hopes to complete the development of the code of conduct that will be open for accession by all States on a voluntary basis at an ad hoc conference.

Lebanon

[Original: Arabic]

[31 March 2009]

The Ministry of Defence notes that Lebanon does not engage in any activities in outer space and affirms the following:

- World peace must be preserved in space and the occurrence of any arms race or "star wars" prevented;
- International cooperation and mutual understanding must be strengthened in compliance with the Declaration on Principles of International Law;
- The Secretary-General of the United Nations must be notified by the States parties of any phenomenon they may discover in outer space that endangers human life or health;
- The necessary legislation and strict deterrent regulations must be established to prevent the exploitation and utilization of outer space and an arms race;
- There must be greater transparency, and acknowledgement of the importance of confidence-building measures as a means of ensuring the attainment of the objective of preventing armament in outer space and the establishment of bases or installations therein;
- Missile and nuclear activities in space should be monitored in order to avert the dangers arising from such activities, which are a threat to peace and security.

Mexico

[Original: Spanish]

[31 March 2009]

1. Mexico considers that protecting the infrastructure of space-based assets is a priority, and towards that end it is essential to avert a major accident in outer space. One way of preserving outer space for exclusively peaceful purposes is to strengthen international cooperation, in particular with respect to the safety and protection of space assets. In this regard and in accordance with Mexico's commitment to maintain the peaceful and universal character of outer space, our country is promoting greater transparency in the activities carried out in this area by the different States, in particular with reference to the Latin America and Caribbean region.

2. Mexico has participated actively in the five Space Conferences of the Americas and contributes to the implementation of the measures identified in their plans of action. At the present time it is considering the possibility of hosting the sixth Space Conference of the Americas, as it considers participation in such forums important because, among other reasons, the United Nations General Assembly has urged the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space to continue studying ways and means of fostering regional and interregional cooperation.

3. In the legal sphere, Mexico's aim is for the universal application of the provisions contained in United Nations treaties relating to outer space to help promote international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space and foster greater transparency and confidence in space activities. Mexico considers that the implementation of voluntary guidelines on the reduction of space debris at the national level would lead to greater mutual understanding with respect to space activities and thereby would increase stability in space and reduce the likelihood of friction and conflicts. In Mexico's view, it is essential that States that have not yet ratified or acceded to these treaties should consider the possibility of doing so.

4. In short, Mexico supports access by all States to the benefits of the peaceful use of science and space technology through international cooperation, including training and education for personnel and participation in international projects entailing the transfer of technology.

Nicaragua

[Original: Spanish]
[11 March 2009]

1. Nicaragua recognizes the interest and right of all States with respect to the exploration and utilization of outer space for peaceful purposes. However, given the current state of international law and in the light of recent events, there is a need to strengthen the implementation of the existing instruments in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, which would have serious consequences for international peace and security. In addition, as stated in the Final Document of the 2006 Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, held in Havana, there is an urgent need for the commencement of substantive work in the Conference on Disarmament on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

2. There is a need to ensure that Member States that carry out significant peaceful scientific activities in outer space should share their experience with States that do not have space programmes through a specific mechanism for this purpose covering existing and future space programmes.

3. Outer space affairs are handled by the Nicaraguan Civil Aeronautics Institute (INAC), a body of the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure of the Government of Nicaragua. Nicaragua's primary interest has been and continues to be to benefit from access to satellite technology for use in aviation communications, meteorology and geographical information systems such as the global positioning system (GPS). Nicaragua has access to these systems through institutions that cooperate with it, such as the Central American Corporation for Air Navigation Services (COCESNA), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in the field of aviation, and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) in the field of meteorology.

4. It is keen to participate actively in international forums to promote greater development and understanding of the peaceful uses of outer space. Its policy favours developing these means for scientific and peaceful purposes.

5. Nicaragua shares the concern of the international community over possible accidents or safety failures connected with the use of nuclear power sources in outer space that have been developed for and installed on spacecraft, precisely in those cases where the specific requirements of the mission and limitations with respect to

electric power and thermal management rule out the use of non-nuclear power sources.

6. Nicaragua takes the view that close attention must be paid to these matters owing to the presence of radioactive or combustible nuclear materials in nuclear power sources used in outer space and the possibility that they can cause harm to persons or the environment of the Earth's biosphere should an accident occur. We believe that safety must always be an intrinsic element in the design and use of this kind of technology. It is important to take into account that safety, that is to say the protection of persons and the environment, must be an integral part of research in this field.

Qatar

[Original: Arabic]

[14 April 2009]

The State of Qatar affirms the need for transparency in activities in outer space. Such activities should be restricted to peaceful uses for the benefit of mankind and the militarization of outer space or its use for military or missile-related activities should be avoided. We also support the development of a unified definition of outer space, the entry into force of a treaty on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and guarantees of the right of States to conduct peaceful scientific research related to outer space.

Syrian Arab Republic

[Original: Arabic]

[9 March 2009]

1. The Syrian Arab Republic considers that outer space is the heritage of all mankind and must be used for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all States.
2. The Syrian Arab Republic emphasizes that the increased importance of outer space, particularly in the field of communications and data exchange at the cosmic level, requires cooperation between all States in order to ensure the continued peaceful and fully transparent utilization of space. The Syrian Arab Republic also emphasizes the necessity of taking measures to ensure confidence-building and the exchange of data between all States, particularly those States that engage in space activities.
3. The Syrian Arab Republic considers that those States that have capabilities in outer space bear a responsibility to ensure its peaceful and non-military utilization, to refrain from engaging in an arms race in outer space and to keep it free of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction.
4. The Syrian Arab Republic expresses its support for the establishment of a subsidiary body of the Conference on Disarmament — as the only multilateral negotiating forum in the field of disarmament — to hold negotiations on a convention to prevent an arms race in outer space as part of a comprehensive and balanced programme of work dealing, on an equal footing, with the substantive issues on its agenda.

5. In this connection, the Syrian Arab Republic expresses its support for the joint Russian-Chinese initiative on a draft treaty prohibiting an arms race, the stockpiling of weapons in outer space and the threat of force against targets in outer space that was submitted to the Conference on Disarmament on 12 February 2008.

Ukraine

[Original: Russian]

[10 April 2009]

1. Ukraine, as a space Power, is interested in keeping outer space free from weapons and military activities. Outer space is the heritage of all humanity and should therefore be used for peaceful purposes. Our Government has consistently advocated the prevention of the militarization of outer space and opposed the placement of any weapons of mass destruction in outer space.
2. The root of the problem with regard to military security in outer space is the fact that international space law prohibits only the placement in orbit of weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere. It does not prohibit the use of outer space for military purposes or the use in outer space of weapons other than weapons of mass destruction. However, the placement of weapons in outer space will have negative consequences for arms control and will essentially lead to armed conflict in outer space itself. In the opinion of Ukraine, the time has come for a complete prohibition on the placement and use of any kind of weapon in outer space, which is the common heritage of mankind. We agree that the most effective way to resolve this issue is to draft a new treaty that would fill the existing gaps in international space law.
3. Ukraine supports the initiative of the Russian Federation and China for the conclusion of a treaty on prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and the threat or use of force against outer space objects.
4. Ukraine, as a country with significant capacities for conducting outer space programmes, has consistently and rigorously adhered to the international legal principles regulating outer space activities.
5. Ukraine supports the view that transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities help to create an environment conducive to resolving international problems, and improving and developing international relations on the basis of cooperation, while facilitating the management of situations that could lead to international tension. Transparency and confidence-building measures as such reduce the risk of a mistaken perception or assessment of another State's military activity, while contributing to the prevention of military confrontation and the application on that basis of the principle of the non-use of force or of the threat of force, and the strengthening of regional and global stability.
6. Ukraine is convinced that broad international cooperation on the exploration of outer space builds mutual confidence between States and contributes to the development of their cooperation in all areas of international life. Ukraine also holds the view that one of the ways to achieve the goal of identifying concrete measures for transparency and confidence-building in outer space is international cooperation based on the exchange of information and data. The Government of

Ukraine implements the following transparency and confidence-building measures in relation to outer space activities:

- Reports to the Secretary-General each year on the nature, progress and results of its outer space activities
- Systematically provides data on space objects that have been launched and space objects that are no longer in orbit
- Provides information to the international community on a regular basis through the official website of the National Space Agency of Ukraine on the number, generic class and payload of Ukrainian space launch vehicles launched
- Provides the Executive Secretariat of the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation with prior notifications on a regular basis of launches of Ukrainian launch vehicles in the context of the Sea Launch programme and annual statements on Ukraine's policies regarding the launching of outer space launch vehicles and ballistic missiles

7. Ukraine believes that States should strictly comply with the provisions of international treaties to which they are parties, namely:

- The basic United Nations treaties on outer space (particularly taking account of the provisions of article IV of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, of 27 January 1967, and article IV of the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space of 14 January 1975)
- The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty of 24 September 1996
- The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water of 5 August 1963

8. Ukraine supports the initiative for a European code of conduct for outer space activities.

9. In addition, Ukraine proposes that the information from the annual declarations providing an outline of the policies of the States subscribing to the Hague Code of Conduct with respect to launch programmes for ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles be used to draw up an annual consolidated report by the Secretary-General.

10. Ukraine supports the view that the work on transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities (as in the context of the Conference on Disarmament and the First Committee of the General Assembly) may be an important consolidating factor in relation to outer space, and also lead to specific results:

- A careful and responsible approach to the exploration and use of outer space
- The achievement of strategic stability and international security
- The strengthening of a climate of confidence and cooperation in outer space activities.

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General and complete disarmament**Reducing nuclear danger****Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International
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* A/64/50.



I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to requests contained in General Assembly resolutions 63/46, 63/47 and 63/49.
2. In paragraph 22 of resolution 63/46, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to submit to it, at its sixty-fourth session, a report on the implementation of the resolution.
3. In paragraph 5 of resolution 63/47, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to intensify efforts and support initiatives that would contribute towards the full implementation of the seven recommendations identified by the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters that would significantly reduce the risk of nuclear war (see A/56/400, para. 3) and to continue to encourage Member States to consider the convening of an international conference, as proposed in the United Nations Millennium Declaration (see Assembly resolution 55/2), to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers, and to report thereon to the Assembly at its sixty-fourth session.
4. In paragraph 3 of resolution 63/49, the General Assembly requested all States to inform the Secretary-General of the efforts and measures they had taken on the implementation of the resolution and nuclear disarmament and requested the Secretary-General to apprise the Assembly of that information at its sixty-fourth session.

II. Observations

5. The Secretary-General, warning that “the risk of proliferation of nuclear and other weapons hangs like a sword of Damocles over our heads”, has set non-proliferation and disarmament as one of his six main priorities for action. In his statement to the Conference on Disarmament on 19 May 2009, he said:

There are now a number of initiatives from nuclear and non-nuclear States that together provide a new momentum for disarmament. They point the way to move from the divisions and paralysis of the past towards genuine dialogue and progress. These signs of greater political will represent an opportunity we cannot afford to miss ... A renewed focus on disarmament and non-proliferation will benefit international security and stability. It can also produce considerable dividends for peace and development. The world is enduring a deep economic and financial crisis. By accelerating disarmament, we can liberate resources that we need to combat climate change, address food insecurity and achieve the Millennium Development Goals. Let us unite behind a shared vision of a safer world. Let us find the courage for bold action to make it a reality.

6. Cautious optimism has gradually emerged during the last 12 months that progress in multilateral nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation could be achieved. A “new momentum” for nuclear disarmament has been spurred on by numerous new global initiatives from Governments and civil society alike. Additional calls for a world free of nuclear weapons, similar to the ones contained in the *Wall Street Journal* articles written by George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn, were made by former statesmen in the United Kingdom of

Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Italy, Germany and Norway. Large global initiatives on nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy and on nuclear security, such as the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, the World Institute for Nuclear Security and Global Zero, have been launched.

7. Some nuclear-weapon States have proposed their own plans on how to move forward towards a world free of nuclear weapons. The United States of America and the Russian Federation have both stated their commitment to the achievement of a world free of nuclear weapons in accordance with their disarmament obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In a joint statement on 1 April, Presidents Medvedev and Obama announced that they had decided to move further along the path of reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms in accordance with United States and Russian obligations under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and that they therefore had decided to begin bilateral intergovernmental negotiations to work out a new, comprehensive, legally binding agreement on reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms to replace the START Treaty, which is due to expire in December 2009. These negotiations have already begun with meetings being held in Washington and Geneva in May and June.

8. On 24 October 2008, the Secretary-General also outlined his own five-point proposal for nuclear disarmament. In a speech delivered at an event hosted by the East-West Institute at United Nations Headquarters in New York, he urged all Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons parties, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to fulfil their obligation under the Treaty to undertake negotiations on effective measures leading to nuclear disarmament, suggesting that this could be achieved by means of a convention or of a framework of agreements with this aim. He also encouraged States to make new efforts to bring the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty into force and called upon the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations on a fissile material treaty immediately and without preconditions. The Secretary-General supported the entry-into-force of existing nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East. In addition, he urged nuclear-weapon States to assure non-nuclear-weapon States that they will not be the subject of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and also underlined the need for further accountability and transparency with regard to nuclear disarmament measures.

9. Tangible progress has been made in several areas. On 21 March, the Treaty on a Central Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone entered into force. This is the first nuclear-weapon-free zone to be established entirely in the northern hemisphere, bordered by two nuclear-weapon States and where nuclear weapons previously existed. It is also the first nuclear-weapon-free zone that requires its parties to conclude with the International Atomic Energy Agency and bring into force an additional protocol to their safeguards agreements within 18 months after the entry into force of the Treaty, and to comply fully with the provisions of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty is close to entry into force, with only one additional State required to ratify the Treaty so as to reach the required number of 28. However, progress on the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East remains difficult to discern.

10. The parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons concluded the third session of its Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference in New York on 15 May. Constructive participation by all States parties created a positive atmosphere and allowed for the early adoption of all procedural arrangements for the 2010 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Review Conference, including its provisional agenda and draft rules of procedure. The Preparatory Committee also endorsed the nomination of Ambassador Libran N. Cabactulan from the Philippines as the President-elect of the Conference. Deep differences persist among parties on the three pillars of the Treaty — disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy — and the Committee could not reach agreement on substantive recommendations for the Review Conference; nevertheless, with the decisions taken at the third session States parties have cleared the path for the immediate start of substantive discussions at the 2010 Review Conference. Furthermore, the discussions on three papers containing draft recommendations on the substantive issues before the States parties prepared by the Chairman provided a useful indicator of the issues that would require greater effort if consensus is to be reached at the Review Conference in 2010.

11. The agreement by the Conference on Disarmament on 29 May 2009 on a substantive programme of work for the 2009 session, after over a decade of stagnation and deadlock, was a welcome sign that the multilateral disarmament climate was beginning to improve. The programme of work contained in decision CD/1864 will allow the Conference to establish a working group to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Conference will also establish a working group discussing practical steps for progressive and systematic efforts to reduce nuclear weapons, with the ultimate goal of their elimination, including on approaches towards potential future work of a multilateral character; a working group to discuss substantively, without limitation, all issues related to the prevention of an arms race in outer space; and a working group under the agenda item entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". Further, special coordinators will be appointed to deal with the agenda items entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons", "Comprehensive programme of Disarmament" and "Transparency in armaments". The Secretary-General, who addressed the Conference the week prior to the adoption of the draft programme, welcomed the agreement and believed that it would generate another important impetus to advancing disarmament and non-proliferation, in general, and to achieving success at the 2010 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Review Conference, in particular.

12. The Disarmament Commission launched a new three-year cycle of deliberations in April 2009. The Commission adopted an agenda that allowed for two working groups to be formed during the first year and the commencement of substantive deliberations on: (a) recommendations for achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; and (b) elements of a draft declaration of the 2010s as the fourth disarmament decade, as mandated by the General Assembly. Discussions on those items will continue next year.

13. Progress is still slow, however, in some areas. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has not yet entered into force since it still lacks the ratifications of nine States listed in Annex 2 of the Treaty. In his opening remarks to the fourth

biennial ministerial meeting held in support of the Treaty on 24 September 2008 in New York, the Secretary-General once again urged all Governments that had not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty without delay. He also called upon all States to continue their voluntary adherence to a nuclear-weapon-test moratorium and to refrain from acts contrary to the object and purpose of the Treaty prior to its entry into force. He also stressed that efforts must be redoubled to achieve deeper reductions in nuclear arsenals and to further diminish the role of nuclear weapons in security policies. In October, the Secretary-General, as Depository of the Treaty, sent letters to the nine countries whose ratifications are required for the Treaty to enter into force, urging them to do so as soon as possible.

14. Nuclear-weapon States have continued to emphasize the importance of nuclear deterrence in their security policies. Complete nuclear disarmament is regarded as dependant upon the fulfilment of a number of other preconditions, such as ensuring regional peace and stability, preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons to non-State actors, making sure that all States possessing nuclear weapons, not just the five nuclear-weapon States, disarm fully, and ensuring that the complete elimination of nuclear weapons from all arsenals is verifiable and irreversible so as to prevent a reversal of such efforts. Proposals for the negotiation of a universal nuclear-weapon convention banning the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons are still referred to as premature. While committing to further deep cuts in their nuclear arsenals, nuclear-weapon States maintain that until the above conditions are met, they consider it important that their nuclear weapons remain a necessary deterrent.

15. On 25 May 2009, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea conducted a second underground nuclear test, in direct violation of the terms set out in Security Council resolution 1718 (2006). The Security Council condemned the test in the strongest terms and on 12 June adopted resolution 1874 (2009), whereby its strengthened existing financial and arms-related sanctions, including a call upon all States to inspect all cargo to and from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and to inspect vessels, with the consent of the flag State, if the State concerned had information providing reasonable grounds to believe that the prohibited items referred to in resolution 1718 (2006) were present. While small arms and light weapons and their related materiel were exempted, States were called upon to exercise vigilance over the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of small arms or light weapons and to notify the Committee at least five days prior to selling, supplying or transferring small arms or light weapons to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

16. The Secretary-General welcomed the unanimous adoption of Security Council resolution 1874 (2009) and reiterated his conviction that all differences should be resolved in a peaceful manner through dialogue, while calling upon the concerned parties to refrain from taking any measures that could exacerbate tensions in the region and to exert their best efforts to re-engage in dialogue, including through the six-party talks. He later also stressed that the test underscored the urgency of bringing the Treaty into force without further delay.

17. The International Atomic Energy Agency continued its efforts to verify the peaceful nature of the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Agency has also investigated allegations concerning a destroyed building at the Dair

Alzour site in the Syrian Arab Republic and sought to clarify the presence of uranium particles there.

18. The Secretary-General and the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs have continued their efforts to promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation globally through direct interaction with Governments and civil society alike and through advocacy and other outreach activities. In addition to presenting his own five-point plan for disarmament, the Secretary-General also launched an Internet-campaign to inform the public of the urgency of taking immediate measures to reach the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. Nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons remain one of the Secretary-General's six main priorities.

III. Information received from Governments

19. By a note verbale dated 11 February 2009, all Member States were invited to inform the Secretary-General of the efforts and measures they had taken with regard to the implementation of resolution 63/49, concerning the follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*. To date, Cuba, El Salvador, Japan, Lebanon, Lithuania, Mexico, Nicaragua and Qatar have sent replies, the texts of which are reproduced below. Additional replies received from Member States will be issued as addenda to the present report.

Cuba

[Original: Spanish]

[11 June 2009]

1. On 8 July 1996, the International Court of Justice issued its historic advisory opinion on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*. Cuba notes with concern that, despite the Court's opinion, humankind still runs the risk of annihilation as a result of the existence and potential use of an immense arsenal of nuclear weapons.
2. Notwithstanding the proclaimed end of the Cold War, there are some 25,000 nuclear weapons in the world, over 10,200 of which are ready for immediate use.
3. The risk of a nuclear crisis is increasingly imminent. It is disturbing that the use of this kind of weapon remains a fundamental part of the military doctrines of certain nuclear Powers. Worse yet, the authorities of one of them, the United States of America, have stated that it may use them even against non-nuclear-weapon States in response to attacks using non-nuclear weapons.
4. For non-nuclear-weapon States that are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, this situation gives cause for serious concern. The nuclear-weapon States have a legal obligation not only to pursue, but also to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament under strict and effective international verification.

5. Paradoxically, some of the nuclear Powers hypocritically limit the nuclear problem to the issue of horizontal non-proliferation, to the detriment of nuclear disarmament, while they themselves are updating their nuclear arsenals in what amounts to vertical proliferation. A clear example is the United States "Complex 2030" programme, which entails an expenditure of \$150 billion over the next 25 years to update nuclear weapons research and infrastructure.

6. The international community's multilateral mechanisms and instruments for addressing issues related to disarmament and arms control are being prevented from achieving their goals. Examples include the inability to implement the 13 practical steps adopted at the 2000 Sixth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; the failures of the 2005 World Summit, the Outcome Document of which could not even contain a reference to disarmament, and, subsequently, of the 2005 Seventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; and the continued inability of the Conference on Disarmament to hold urgent negotiations on a phased disarmament programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Cuba hopes that the new Government of the United States, which has made encouraging promises in that regard, will demonstrate the necessary political will to move the negotiations forward and obtain concrete results at the 2010 Eighth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Conference on Disarmament.

7. In September 2006, Cuba had the honour of presiding over the Fourteenth Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Havana. At this event, the leaders confirmed that nuclear disarmament is a top priority with respect to disarmament and arms control and reaffirmed the importance of the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and to bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. This was confirmed at the Fifteenth Ministerial Conference of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Tehran in July 2008, and, more recently, at the Ministerial Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement, held in Havana from 27 to 30 April 2009.

8. Cuba is a State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to the international treaties on chemical and biological weapons. In the United Nations General Assembly, it supports resolutions that advocate the total elimination of nuclear weapons, such as resolution 63/46 on nuclear disarmament and resolution 63/75 on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons.

9. As a member of the Conference on Disarmament, Cuba is in favour of giving priority to commencing negotiations on a phased programme for nuclear disarmament, culminating in the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, and has been among the sponsors of concrete initiatives developed by the Group of 21 for that purpose. This position extends to Cuba's participation in the United Nations Disarmament Commission, where it has joined the other countries members of the Non-Aligned Movement in proposing a set of recommendations aimed at achieving nuclear disarmament.

10. The recommendations submitted to the United Nations Disarmament Commission show how the members of the Non-Aligned Movement, including

Cuba, are acting in a manner consistent with the aims and purposes of General Assembly resolution 63/49.

11. The lack of progress in the area of nuclear disarmament means that the views that the Government of the Republic of Cuba conveyed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations pursuant to resolution 61/83, published in the report of the Secretary-General (A/62/165), remain entirely valid.

12. Cuba reiterates that nuclear non-proliferation, while important, is not an end in itself but rather a means of achieving the ultimate, supreme goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. It also stresses that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only sure way of avoiding the catastrophic consequences of their use. The current nuclear weapons, which are thousands of times more powerful than the bombs that the United States of America used against the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would cause destruction and genocide far more devastating than those of 1945.

13. The use of nuclear weapons would have catastrophic consequences for all known forms of life on Earth. Their use would, moreover, constitute a flagrant violation of international standards on the prevention of genocide and on environmental protection. The international community should insist on compliance with the commitment to achieving the objective of the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the creation of a world free of such lethal weapons.

14. Cuba maintains that the use of nuclear weapons is completely immoral and cannot be justified by any concept or a doctrine of security. It is highly disturbing, and completely unnecessary, that nuclear weapons still exist and that new and more sophisticated ones which pose a grave threat to all humanity, especially for countries that do not possess such weapons of mass destruction, continue to be developed.

El Salvador

[Original: Spanish]

[17 April 2009]

1. As a Member State of the United Nations, El Salvador has signed and ratified various international instruments relating to nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

2. At the multilateral level, El Salvador also participates actively in the promotion of all relevant initiatives aimed at strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament regime at the regional and international levels.

3. El Salvador participates in the various training and awareness-raising programmes on disarmament, nuclear arsenal reduction and the prevention of nuclear proliferation in all its aspects.

4. The plan to modernize and equip the Armed Forces of El Salvador does not include the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

5. El Salvador has consistently supported all United Nations General Assembly resolutions aimed at nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.

6. As a member of the Central American Integration System and other regional groups represented at the United Nations, El Salvador has endorsed the various declarations calling upon States to fulfil the obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to the adoption of a legally binding multilateral instrument on nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control, as specified in the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice.

7. As a member of the Central American Integration System and other regional groups represented at the United Nations, El Salvador has also joined in calls for the nuclear-weapon States to take all necessary steps to conclude a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

8. The Government of El Salvador wishes to underscore the urgent need for the international community, and especially the non-nuclear-weapon States and international civil society, to continue their systematic and consistent efforts to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament regime.

Japan

[Original: English]
[29 May 2009]

Commitment to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles

1. The Government of Japan continues to firmly commit itself to the "Three Non-Nuclear Principles", which describes the policy of not possessing, not producing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. Successive Cabinets of Japan, including the incumbent Cabinet under Prime Minister Aso, have repeatedly articulated that Japan will continue to uphold these principles.

Submission of resolutions on nuclear disarmament to the United Nations General Assembly

2. Every year since 1994 Japan has submitted its resolutions on nuclear disarmament to the United Nations General Assembly. In 2008, taking into consideration the recent international situation surrounding nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, Japan once again submitted its draft resolution on nuclear disarmament to the United Nations General Assembly. On 2 December 2008, the draft resolution was adopted at the plenary meeting of the General Assembly by an overwhelming majority of 173 votes in favour, which is the highest number ever.

3. Although the situation surrounding nuclear disarmament remains challenging, in response to the political will of a large majority of the international community, which was expressed through the adoption of that resolution, Japan intends to pursue its various diplomatic efforts to maintain and reinforce the international disarmament and non-proliferation regime based on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

Efforts for the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

4. Japan attaches great importance to the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which constitutes one of the major pillars of the NPT regime. From this point of view, Japan has made various efforts, including the following:

- As an effort to promote the early ratification by the annex II States, in August 2008, Japan invited Government officials from non-ratification States to visit facilities of the International Monitoring System (IMS) hosted by Japan and to exchange views on the Treaty with relevant Japanese authorities. Japan, together with Australia, Austria, Canada, Costa Rica, Finland and the Netherlands, co-hosted the Fourth CTBT Friends Ministerial Meeting in September 2008, which issued a joint ministerial statement. The statement calls for the immediate signing and ratification of the Treaty and the continuation of the moratorium on nuclear tests. The statement has been signed by 96 countries, exceeding the results of the past three meetings.
- Efforts to establish a nuclear-test-ban verification regime, including the IMS, undertaken by the Preparatory Commission for the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) continue. Japan has already established all the necessary monitoring stations in its territory as part of the robust worldwide verification mechanism to ensure the early detection of nuclear explosions.

Activities in preparation for the commencement of fissile material cut-off treaty negotiations

5. Japan gives emphasis to the importance and urgency of the commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). As a concrete contribution to this end, Japan presented, in May 2006, a working paper on an FMCT to the Conference on Disarmament (CD), aimed at deepening discussions on the substantive issues of an FMCT, and facilitating the early commencement of FMCT negotiations.

6. Japan has been making its utmost efforts to break the current stalemate at the CD, thereby realizing the early commencement of negotiations on an FMCT. Japan has redoubled its endeavours for this purpose through the dispatch of high-level representatives to the CD at various opportunities. Ambassador Sumio Tarui was the coordinator at the CD in 2008 for agenda items 1 and 2, with a general focus on the prohibition of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Japan appealed to the members of the CD to commence negotiations on an FMCT without delay on many of occasions.

Contribution to the 2010 NPT review process

7. As tangible contributions to the preparatory process for the 2010 Review Conference, Ambassador Yukiya Amano contributed as the Chairman to the success of the first session of the Preparatory Committee. On 27 April 2009, Minister for Foreign Affairs Hirofumi Nakasone made a Statement about global nuclear disarmament in Tokyo. He addressed the importance of practical steps towards a world free of nuclear weapons and presented 11 benchmarks for "global nuclear

disarmament". This proposal was formally made by Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Masahiko Shibayama at the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

8. Japan submitted to the Preparatory Committee of the Review Conference a working paper on the theme "Eleven benchmarks for global nuclear disarmament" (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.13) and one on Cluster 3 (NPT/CONF.2010/PC.III/WP.38).

9. Japan and Australia jointly launched the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND) as a second-track enterprise involving various eminent individuals. The Commission aims to produce by the end of 2009 a realistic, practical and action-oriented report with a view to contributing to the success of the 2010 Review Conference and presenting a roadmap towards a world free of nuclear weapons.

Cooperation for denuclearization in Russia

10. At the Kananaskis Summit in June 2002, G-8 leaders announced the G-8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction to address non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety issues. Japan committed itself, for the purpose of this Partnership, to make a contribution amounting to over US\$ 200 million, out of which US\$ 100 million is to be allocated to the G-8 programme for disposal of Russian surplus weapons-grade plutonium and the rest to projects for dismantling decommissioned Russian nuclear submarines. Since then Japan has extended cooperation to the Russian Federation and completed the dismantlement of four decommissioned nuclear submarines. Japan is committed to funding the dismantlement of two additional submarines. Furthermore, in 2006, Japan decided to cooperate in the construction of an on-shore storage facility for reactor compartments at Razboynik Bay, and on May 2009 the implementing arrangement was signed to this end.

11. In April 2008, based on the prospect that all decommissioned nuclear submarines in the Russian Far East would be dismantled by 2010, including those being dismantled through the cooperation between Japan and the Russian Federation, Japan expressed its intention to consider additional areas for bilateral cooperation.

Efforts to promote disarmament and non-proliferation education

12. Since 1983, Japan has invited more than 650 participants in the United Nations disarmament fellowship programme to Japan, including to the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This has provided these young officials, who will be responsible for future disarmament diplomacy, with an opportunity to witness the horrendous and long-lasting consequences caused by atomic bombs. Japan will continue to contribute to this programme.

13. Japan believes that the international community should be well informed of the destructive effects of nuclear weapons. In accordance with the wish of the people of Japan that such weapons never be used again, the Government of Japan has supported, on a number of occasions, the efforts of local governments and NGOs in foreign countries to organize exhibitions relating to atomic bombs.

14. On the margins of the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference in 2008, Japan hosted a disarmament and non-proliferation education seminar on how experiences of nuclear devastation should be handed down from one generation to the next. The manga related to the experience of the atomic bombings, *Town of Evening Calm, Country of Cherry Blossoms*, was distributed to participants at the session.

15. Within the framework of the United Nations Conference on Disarmament in Saitama, Japan, a forum on the importance of cooperation with the general public on disarmament and non-proliferation education was held with prominent educators in August 2008.

Lebanon

[Original: Arabic]
[6 April 2009]

The Lebanese Republic affirms the following:

- Lebanon does not possess or produce weapons of mass destruction, and complies with United Nations resolutions in that regard. It believes that the threat or use of such weapons is illegal.
- Lebanon supports and welcomes all initiatives aimed at achieving complete and universal disarmament, in particular in the Middle East, which it strongly believes should be a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. It is concerned by Israel's non-compliance with international law as reflected by that country's maintenance of a nuclear arsenal that constitutes a persistent threat to all States in the region and, by extension, to international peace and security.
- The Arab States should continue to demand the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East as the only available option for confronting the threat to international peace and collective Arab security posed by Israeli nuclear weapons and other Israeli weapons of mass destruction.
- The international community should continue to require all States in the region, including Israel, to sign treaties on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons.
- The Arab position should be unified and the League of Arab States should play an effective role. Action should be taken to ensure the acquisition of the scientific expertise and facilities necessary for protection against weapons of mass destruction. Continued efforts should be made to expose Israel as a State that does not heed the call for the development and dissemination of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in areas that serve sustainable development, and to take into account the various needs of the Arab States.

Lithuania

[Original: English]

[27 May 2009]

1. The Republic of Lithuania strongly supports a multilateral disarmament framework and efforts of the international community to strengthen international peace and security and the non-proliferation regime. The Republic of Lithuania is a State party to all international non-proliferation conventions and other relevant legally binding instruments. The Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania explicitly prohibits weapons of mass destruction in the territory of the State. Accordingly, the Republic of Lithuania has never had a nuclear weapon, a military nuclear programme or means of delivery.
2. The Republic of Lithuania assures its commitment to the strengthening of implementation and the universalization of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Mexico

[Original: Spanish]

[5 June 2009]

1. Mexico believes that the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons* is historic because it reaffirms the existence of a legal obligation of States to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects.
2. Almost 13 years after the advisory opinion was handed down, Mexico considers that it remains fully in force and calls attention to the grave danger that nuclear arms represent.
3. Mexico has taken the following actions, initiatives and steps with a view to the total elimination of nuclear weapons:
4. At the sixty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly, Mexico, together with other members of the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden), sponsored a resolution on nuclear disarmament that was adopted by a majority of Member States. Furthermore, together with Australia and New Zealand, it proposed the adoption of a new resolution on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, as well as resolutions on the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education and the United Nations Disarmament Information Programme and a decision on the United Nations conference to identify appropriate ways of eliminating nuclear dangers in the context of nuclear disarmament, with a view to initiating coordination among zones in the lead-up to the second Conference of States Parties and Signatories of Treaties that Establish Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia, to be held in 2010.

Nicaragua

[Original: Spanish]
[6 March 2009]

1. As a peace-loving State, Nicaragua is aware that the use of weapons of mass destruction undermines regional and international stability and that the use of some of these weapons, such as nuclear weapons, endangers the very existence of humankind. The use of such weapons is a flagrant violation of the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of international humanitarian law. In its historic advisory opinion of 8 July 1996, the International Court of Justice established the existence of an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. Furthermore, the General Assembly has reiterated its appeal for all Member States to fulfil that obligation immediately by commencing multilateral negotiations leading to the early conclusion of a convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination in order to build trust between nations and to strengthen international peace and security.

2. It is important to recognize the leadership of Latin America; since 1967, through the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (the Treaty of Tlatelolco), it has been the world's largest nuclear-free zone. In that connection, Nicaragua has legal obligations under a number of international treaties and conventions aimed at the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof.

3. Because of its interest in disarmament, Nicaragua has participated in international conferences held within the framework of the United Nations and in other international forums, at which it has supported multilateral negotiations on disarmament. Nicaragua has worked towards the adoption, evaluation and review of resolutions and declarations on disarmament in order to ensure steady progress towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective control.

Qatar

[Original: Arabic]
[14 April 2009]

Response to United Nations General Assembly resolution 63/49 entitled "Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the *Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons*"

The advisory opinion is of a political rather than a legal nature given that, from a legal standpoint, the use or threat of force is already prohibited. The Charter of the United Nations, article 1, paragraph 1, states that one of the purposes of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security.

To that end, article 2, paragraph 4, states that all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force. That means that States may not even threaten to use force. The kind of force referred to is the force of arms, which cover, by logical necessity, arms of all types, including nuclear weapons.

Because of the nature of its people and by virtue of its Constitution, Qatar is a peace-loving State. It enjoys good relations with neighbouring and all other States. Accordingly, disputing parties place their trust and confidence in the ability of Qatar to mediate a number of disputes, as has been demonstrated by the following:

- Qatar played a successful role in mediating an end to clashes between Government forces and the Houthi rebels in the Sa'da Governorate of Yemen.
- Qatar successfully mediated a resolution to the dispute between the pro-Government alliance and the opposition in Lebanon.
- Qatar plays an ongoing role in efforts to resolve the Darfur crisis.
- The Palestinians are expecting Qatar to play a role in ending the dispute between Hamas and Fatah.

In article 6, the Constitution of Qatar provides that the State shall honour international pacts and treaties and implement all international agreements, pacts and treaties to which it is a party, including the Charter of the United Nations, which prohibits the threat or use of force. Article 7 of the Constitution states that the foreign policy of the State shall be based on the principle of consolidating peace, while article 71 states that wars of aggression are prohibited.



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Item 95 (q) of the preliminary list*

General and complete disarmament

Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction

Report of the Secretary-General

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I. Introduction

1. In its resolution 63/60, entitled "Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction", the General Assembly urged all Member States to take and strengthen national measures, as appropriate, to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and materials and technologies related to their manufacture. The Assembly requested the Secretary-General to compile a report on measures already taken by international organizations on issues relating to the linkage between the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to seek the views of Member States on additional relevant measures, including national measures, for tackling the global threat posed by the acquisition by terrorists of weapons of mass destruction and to report to the Assembly at its sixty-fourth session. The present report is submitted in response to that request.

2. By a note verbale dated 11 February 2009, Member States were invited to inform the Secretary-General of the measures taken, and to communicate their views on the issue. On 6 February 2009, letters were also dispatched to relevant international organizations, including relevant bodies and agencies of the United Nations, inviting them to provide executive summaries of their contributions for inclusion in the report of the Secretary-General, while their submissions, in extenso, are posted on the website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs, if so requested by the invited organization prior to the issuance of the report as a document of the United Nations. Organizations that had reported their relevant activities in 2007 were invited to submit only new information in relation to what they had previously submitted.

3. As at 2 July 2009, replies had been received from Andorra, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Poland, Qatar, Tajikistan, Thailand and Ukraine, which are reproduced or summarized in section II of the present report. Replies were also received from 10 international organizations and are summarized in section III of the present report.

II. Replies received from Member States

Andorra

[Original: French]

[23 April 2009]

1. The Principality of Andorra is a country with a long tradition of peace, which has lived through more than seven centuries without war or conflict and has always expressed its support at the international level for disarmament measures. Andorra should like to recall that it has no army and possesses no weapons of mass destruction of any kind, whether biological, chemical or nuclear. Furthermore, Andorra has never allowed the development on its territory of any activity or industry related to the use of nuclear, chemical or biological products. Andorra does not produce, develop, market, buy, possess, use or have stocks of any chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, their delivery systems or the products mentioned.

2. Lastly, the Principality of Andorra also reports that it has adopted 12 of the 13 United Nations counter-terrorism conventions and that it cooperates with the committees established in pursuance of Security Council resolutions by providing the information that they request. In that connection, Andorra informs the Office for Disarmament Affairs that it will find additional information on Andorra's laws and procedures relating to countering the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the reports provided to the Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

Belarus*

[Original: Russian]

[28 May 2009]

1. Significant changes have occurred in the Republic of Belarus with regard to the enhancement of national nuclear and radiation safety legislation and regulatory infrastructure. The changes attest to the fact that Belarus' obligations under the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism are being met.
2. In August 2008, the Act of the Republic of Belarus on the use of nuclear energy entered into force. Pursuant to article 7 of the Act, in order to implement State regulation of activities to guarantee safety in the use of nuclear energy, the Ministry of Emergency Situations of the Republic of Belarus, within its competence, exercises State oversight of nuclear and radiation safety as well as physical protection for sites where nuclear energy is used. Article 23 of the Act establishes that measures to ensure the physical protection of a nuclear facility and/or storage site should be planned for at all stages of design, construction, commissioning, operation, limitation of operating specifications, operating time limit extension, decommissioning and also during handling of nuclear materials, spent nuclear materials and/or operational radioactive waste.
3. A Belarus Council of Ministers decision on approval of the regulations for the physical protection of sites where nuclear energy is used and State oversight of such physical protection will be established in the very near future, in accordance with the plan of work of the government bodies on implementing the Act of Belarus on the use of nuclear energy, approved on 22 September 2008 by the First Deputy Prime Minister of Belarus, Vladimir Semashko.
4. Under Presidential decree No. 565 of 12 November 2007 on certain measures related to the construction of nuclear power stations, a regulatory body, the Department of Nuclear and Radiation Safety of the Ministry of Emergency Situations of Belarus, has been established, and the regulations governing the Department have been approved. Pursuant to those regulations, its main tasks are to exercise State oversight in the maintenance of nuclear and radiation safety and monitoring of legal compliance in the area of nuclear and radiation safety.
5. The obligations of Belarus within the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards agreement are being fully met. The safekeeping of nuclear

* The full text of the information provided by the Government of Belarus is available on the website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs (<http://www.un.org/disarmament>). An executive summary was provided for inclusion in the present report.

material and storage conditions as well as the state of physical protection for nuclear material and facilities are guaranteed. In November 2005, the Republic of Belarus concluded an Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the Republic of Belarus and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

6. The Republic of Belarus is fully implementing the provisions of the Convention on Nuclear Safety.

7. Regulatory acts governing monitoring of the movement of nuclear materials across the customs frontier of the Republic of Belarus are in effect.

8. International cooperation includes an Agreement between the Governments of Belarus and the People's Republic of China on cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, already signed, and an Agreement between the Governments of Belarus and the Russian Federation on cooperation in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, currently at the signing stage.

9. To prevent acquisition by terrorists of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems and materials and technologies related to their manufacture, the Armed Forces of Belarus carry out an annual inventory of ionizing radiation sources, monthly monitoring of the safety of ionizing radiation sources and ongoing monitoring of the radiation, chemical and biological conditions in areas where military units are deployed.

Kazakhstan

[Original: Russian]

[2 July 2009]

In order to comply with General Assembly resolutions on the control and limitation of documentation prepared by the Secretariat and the guidelines of the Secretary-General for reports drafted and/or compiled by the Secretariat, the reply received from the Government of Kazakhstan has not been reproduced since it exceeded the acceptable page limit. The full text of the reply is available on the website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs (<http://www.un.org/disarmament>).

Lebanon*

[Original: Arabic]

[21 May 2009]

1. Lebanon affirms that:

- It does not possess weapons of mass destruction and abides by United Nations resolutions that seek to prevent terrorists from using or acquiring such weapons;
- It has introduced laws and regulations to permit the monitoring of the export, transit and cross-border movement of all types of weapons, prohibit trafficking

* The full text of the information provided by the Government of Lebanon is available on the website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs (<http://www.un.org/disarmament>). An executive summary was provided for inclusion in the present report.

therein and provide for the prosecution of terrorists, should there be any. Lebanese law prohibits the harbouring of terrorists;

- It is encouraging closer international cooperation, participates in international counter-terrorism efforts and has developed the necessary legislation and strict deterrent regulations needed to arrest, monitor and pursue terrorists, should there be any;
- It strives to prevent the proliferation of such weapons, promotes arms control and supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. It is opposed to the use or the threat of use of those weapons;
- It condemns all forms of terrorism and is in favour of coordinating international counter-terrorism efforts;
- It is deeply concerned by the failure of Israel to comply with international law, thereby constituting a grave threat to all States in the region.

2. Lebanon has also taken the following measures:

A. Security

At the direction of the Government and operating under the direct supervision of the Public Prosecutor (Court of Cassation), the Lebanese security forces endeavour to identify and break up terrorist cells and networks, arrest their members and bring them before the competent court. The security forces also seize all weapons belonging to such groups and cells, whether they be light or heavy weapons, explosives or any other material that can be used to cause great harm, such as chemical or bacteriological agents. A quantity of cyanide was seized when the members of one terrorist network were arrested.

B. Legislation

With respect to legislation, the draft amended Lebanese Penal Code now includes the crime of bioterrorism. In addition to setting out the penalties for bioterrorism, the amended Code contains provisions on the import, storage and manufacture of biological material. The draft Code also calls for the creation of a supreme body, composed of two members from each of the Ministries of Defence, Interior, Health and Environment, as well as a representative from the Lebanese Customs, responsible for controlling all ports and harbours and land, air and sea borders and preventing the entry of such material, unless authorized by that same authority. In addition, the draft Code calls for the installation of modern equipment at border crossings and ports in order to detect chemical, bacteriological, biological and nuclear material.

Mexico*

[Original: Spanish]

[3 June 2009]

Multilateral measures

1. Mexico, during the ninth regular session of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE), promoted the adoption of the Declaration on Strengthening Border Controls and International Cooperation in the Fight against Terrorism. Furthermore, Mexico has assumed the presidency of CICTE for 2009 and will promote activities that strengthen border controls.
2. The National Nuclear Safety and Safeguards Commission (CNSNS) maintains constant contact with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the subject of safeguards and nuclear physical security, in order to comply with the instruments in that area to which Mexico is a party.

Bilateral measures

3. On 15 April 2009, the Ministry of the Navy signed a Letter of Intent with the United States Northern Command and with the United States Coast Guard, with a view to strengthening information sharing and cooperation between their organizations with regard to maritime security and protection in order to improve their mutual capacity for operational coordination.
4. In addition, CNSNS has collaborated closely with the General Customs Administration on the megaport project being conducted with the United States, the goal of which is to install radioactive and nuclear material detection equipment at Mexico's main cargo ports.

National measures

5. Mexico has made efforts to strengthen its warning system and system for monitoring information on manifests and airway bills, in order to generate information that can be used to identify and alert customs posts to potential risks of illegal trafficking of precursor chemicals, arms, drugs and marketable securities, and piracy.
6. In the area of interdepartmental coordination, on 7 March 2008 the Ministry of the Navy and the Tax Administration Service signed the basic coordination documents for combining their efforts and allocating human resources for the joint implementation of monitoring, surveillance and security measures at Mexico's maritime customs posts.
7. In addition, on 21 January 2009, the General Customs Administration and the Ministry of the Navy signed a coordination and cooperation agreement in order to work together to improve national surveillance, monitoring, protection and security in special tax areas, customs houses and ports.

* The full text of the information provided by the Government of Mexico is available on the website of the office for Disarmament Affairs (<http://www.un.org/disarmament>). An executive summary was provided for inclusion in the present report

8. In 2003, CNSNS began its close collaboration with the General Customs Administration to participate in a training programme in the identification and detection of radioactive materials for front-line officials at the forty-nine customs posts.

Nicaragua

[Original: Spanish]

[6 March 2009]

1. Nicaragua does not possess weapons of mass destruction and the terrorism issue which has caused so many problems for other States has not appeared in Nicaraguan territory. Nicaragua therefore considers it essential to promote the universalization, transparent application and compliance with international agreements on arms control, in particular the commitments undertaken by Member States under the various international conventions and treaties on disarmament and counter-terrorism. Nicaragua has an efficient legal system that supports its counter-terrorism controls and is a party to 14 international (global and regional) counter-terrorism instruments.

2. Promoting the universalization, transparent application and compliance with international agreements would enhance the transparency of arms purchases and security. It would contribute to building confidence among States and would reduce the level and scale of military spending. It would be possible to achieve full human development, which is understood as sustainable development that is people-centred and exercised in an environment of governance and peace.

Panama

[Original: Spanish]

[15 May 2009]

1. In connection with General Assembly resolution 63/30, the Republic of Panama considers that, as a strategic link in world trade and a transit country, it supports the efforts of the international community to establish measures for strengthening controls to prevent terrorist groups from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and technologies related to their manufacture.

2. The Republic of Panama supports this initiative and draws attention to its development of a new vision of security, emphasizing the security of global transport and trade, through the adoption of the Panamanian Initiative for Secure Trade and Transportation (IPC&TS), as a means of reducing the threat from international organized crime and terrorism in their various forms. This involves programmes for the non-intrusive inspection of containers to detect illicit trafficking in dual-use goods and materials intended for the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction.

3. The Republic of Panama has strengthened the analysis and operational units involved in combating terrorism in the various security agencies and the penalties for the relevant criminal acts are set out in Act No. 14 of 18 May 2007.

4. Act 14 of 2007, in its article 287, specifies a penalty of from 20 to 30 years of imprisonment for any person who, with the aim of disturbing the public peace, causes panic, terror or fear in the population or part of the population, or uses radioactive material, weapons, fire, explosives, biological or toxic substances or any other means of mass destruction or element with such potential, against living beings, public services, property or other items.

5. The penalty shall be a term of imprisonment of from 25 to 30 years for the heads of organizations or terrorist cells or for any person who helps to establish them or who causes the death of one or more persons.

6. Article 293 provides that anyone who uses genetic engineering to produce biological weapons or weapons to destroy humankind shall be punished with a term of imprisonment of from 15 to 25 years.

7. Article 436 of the Act provides that anyone who uses or orders the use of means or methods of combat that are prohibited or cause unnecessary suffering or excessive, lasting and serious damage to the natural environment, or that adversely affect the health or survival of the population, shall be penalized with a term of imprisonment of 15 years.

8. The same penalty shall be applied to whoever develops, produces, stores, transfers or does not destroy bacteriological, biological, toxic or chemical weapons or anti-personnel mines.

9. The new Penal Code in its Chapter VIII on the possession of and trafficking in arms and explosives, in articles 327, and following, establishes the penalty for trafficking and unlawful possession of firearms as a term of imprisonment of from four to seven years, with an increased penalty for aggravating circumstances, on a case-by-case basis.

10. Similarly, Act 48 of 30 August 2004, which criminalizes gang membership and the possession of and trade in prohibited weapons, sets out measures to protect the identity of witnesses and modifies provisions of the Penal and Judicial Codes and establishes a term of imprisonment for whoever possesses, purchases, sells, manufactures or transfers prohibited or military weapons.

Poland*

[Original: English]

[29 May 2009]

1. Poland is a strong supporter of all international efforts aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, in particular General Assembly resolution 63/60, Security Council resolution 1540, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Proliferation Security Initiative. Poland is party to numerous international agreements regulating the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

* The full text of the information provided by the Government of Poland is available on the website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs (<http://www.un.org/disarmament>). An executive summary was provided for inclusion in the present report.

2. Poland does not possess any weapons of mass destruction or their components. Therefore, there is no direct threat of spreading weapons of mass destruction or the technologies of their production from Poland. Potential threats might be related to illegal trafficking of dual-use items. An important step element of the Polish strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is the 2003 European Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and the EU New Lines for action in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems (December 2008). In 2008 Poland implemented on a national basis two Conventions of the Council of Europe: (a) Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism; and (b) Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism. Furthermore Poland has taken numerous steps in order to implement the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles and to prevent the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists. On 14 May 2009 the motion for ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was submitted in order to continue the ratification procedure.

3. Moreover, in 2008 Poland further strengthened existing, and established new, coordination and cooperation mechanisms for the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Government Security Centre was created. It is responsible for the analysis of current threats, the preparation of crisis management procedures, the supervision of the validity of crisis response plans and the coordination of the institutions and services competent in matters of crisis management.

4. As far as preventing and countering terrorism are concerned, a Counter-terrorist Centre (CAT) was created in October 2008. Its main goal is to increase the capability to anticipate a possible terrorist attack, including an attack with the use of weapons of mass destruction, as well as to coordinate the efforts of the various State institutions involved in the anti-terrorist protection of the nation and the State.

Qatar

[Original: Arabic]
[14 April 2009]

1. Further to General Assembly resolution 63/60 on measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, the State of Qatar supported that resolution and was one of the first States to implement Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) by establishing a committee for arms control, disarmament and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

2. The State of Qatar issued an instrument of accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 29 January 1989 and, later that year, issued Decree No. 38 approving accession to that Treaty.

3. Qatar also signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty on 24 September 1996 and issued Decree No. 54 of 1999 ratifying that Treaty on 8 December 1999. It also ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction on 4 July 2001 by means of Decree No. 32 of

2001. Qatar ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention by means of Decree No. 58 of 25 August 2003.

4. Qatar has established the National Counter-Terrorism Committee as well as the National Arms Control Committee, which is the body responsible for studying draft international instruments on prohibition of weapons, reviewing related legislation and representing Qatar abroad. The latter issued Law No. 17 of 2007 on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

5. Preparations are currently under way for the issuance of a law prohibiting biological weapons, as well as a law on nuclear material.

6. Qatar also hosted a workshop, which took place in March 2009, on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) organized by the Office for Disarmament Affairs with funding from the European Union and the Governments of the United Kingdom, Norway and the United States of America.

7. In his opening address to the workshop, the Chairman of the National Arms Control Committee emphasized the need to begin creating an international database covering all States, including those that had not ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in order to link the information portals of States and facilitate the exchange of information on nuclear, chemical and biological substances, particularly dual-use substances, whether imported by States or in transit through their territory. He also stressed the importance of notification and the issuance of transit permits as the most effective means of monitoring the secure transport of such substances and ensuring that they remain under proper control during the transport process and guarding against their misappropriation and misuse.

Tajikistan

[Original: Russian]
[28 May 2009]

In order to comply with General Assembly resolutions on the control and limitation of documentation prepared by the Secretariat and the guidelines of the Secretary-General for reports drafted and/or compiled by the Secretariat, the reply received from the Government of Tajikistan has not been reproduced since it exceeded the acceptable page limit. The full text of the reply is available on the website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs (<http://www.un.org/disarmament>).

Thailand*

[Original: English]
[26 May 2009]

1. Thailand has continuously undertaken and strengthened national measures, through the works of designated national focal points and various legal instruments, to support the international efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and related materials and technologies.

* The full text of the information provided by the Government of Thailand is available on the website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs (<http://www.un.org/disarmament>). An executive summary was provided for inclusion in the present report.

2. Regarding additional relevant measures, at the national level, Thai concerned agencies are in the process of developing an integrated export control system, incorporating licensing and enforcement, to enhance Thailand's capability in controlling weapons of mass destruction-related materials, particularly sensitive dual-use items.
3. Intelligence cooperation and regional/international mechanisms for information-sharing between exporting and importing countries should be developed so as to monitor and strictly control weapons of mass destruction and weapons of mass destruction-related materials, as well as to alert concerned authorities on suspicious cases. In this regard, points of contact of each country for information-sharing should be designated.
4. As a capacity-building measure, training courses and workshops should be arranged for concerned Thai authorities to exchange views and experiences on how to effectively detect, deter, prevent and combat the transport of illicit weapons of mass destruction and related materials as well as trafficking and brokering which is consistent with international law. Support from more advanced countries in this regard will be welcome.

Ukraine

[Original: Russian]
[27 April 2009]

In order to comply with General Assembly resolutions on the control and limitation of documentation prepared by the Secretariat and the guidelines of the Secretary-General for reports drafted and/or compiled by the Secretariat, the reply received from the Government of Ukraine has not been reproduced since it exceeded the acceptable page limit. The full text of the reply is available on the website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs (<http://www.un.org/disarmament>).

III. Information received from international organizations

A. United Nations system

International Atomic Energy Agency

[Original: English]
[17 June 2009]

1. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) implements a comprehensive plan for strengthening nuclear security, including preventing acquisition by non-State actors of nuclear explosive devices. For effective assistance and coordination, the Agency has expanded the use of Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans, which serve as a reference and framework for implementing nuclear security activities in States.
2. With the aim of assessing the status of States' technical and administrative arrangements for nuclear security, the Agency continued to offer advisory service

missions, fact-finding missions and technical visits. Twenty-one advisory service missions were carried out in 2008.

3. The Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB) is the Agency's information system on incidents of illicit trafficking and other unauthorized activities involving nuclear and other radioactive material. As of 31 December 2008, it benefited from the participation of 103 IAEA Member States and 1 non-Member State. Also as of that date, States had reported and otherwise confirmed 1,562 incidents to the ITDB, of which 336 involved the seizure of nuclear material or radioactive sources from persons who possessed them illegally and, in some cases, attempted to smuggle them across borders.

4. Supporting the development of nuclear security education and training continued to be a priority. The Agency continued to provide nuclear security training to improve and expand the practical nuclear security skills of technical and non-technical personnel in States. More than 1,600 participants from 90 countries participated in the 63 training events held during 2008.

5. The Agency also continued its involvement in projects to secure, through repatriation, disused highly enriched uranium (HEU) research reactor fuel. It assisted in the shipment of more than 175 kg of spent HEU fuel to the Russian Federation. In August 2008, the removal and repatriation of 7 kg of US-origin spent HEU fuel was prepared and managed under an IAEA contract, marking the first time the Agency played a hands-on role in repatriating such material to the United States.

6. Publications in IAEA Nuclear Security Series (NSS) are designed to help States establish a coherent nuclear security infrastructure; to comprise part of the international nuclear security framework; and to identify best practices for nuclear security. In 2008, the Agency published three NSS implementing guides: *Nuclear Security Culture, Preventive and Protective Measures Against Insider Threats* and *Security in the Transport of Radioactive Material*.

7. During 2008, the Agency's Nuclear Security Equipment Laboratory continued to provide technical support to States in national efforts to establish effective border controls. It provided 592 pieces of equipment to 24 States to improve detection and response capabilities.

8. Following the successful implementation of previous projects to assist States in ensuring the nuclear security of major public events, the Agency conducted projects with China and Peru for protecting major sporting and political events. The Agency also had initial discussions on nuclear security for future major public events to take place in China (2010 Shanghai EXPO), South Africa (2010 World Cup), the United Kingdom (2012 Olympics) and Poland and Ukraine (2012 Eurocup). Further information is available at: http://www-ns.iaea.org/security/NSP_2009.htm.

International Civil Aviation Organization*

[Original: English]
[29 May 2009]

1. The 36th Session of the ICAO Assembly adopted Resolution A36-19: *Threat posed to civil aviation by man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS)*, in order to strengthen the aviation community's efforts to address this emerging threat. Among other things, States are urged to exercise strict and effective controls on MANPADS and associated training and technologies, with a view to preventing such weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists.
2. With respect to items carried on board aircraft, ICAO has distributed detailed guidance material to States on restricting the carriage of liquids, aerosols and gels (LAGs). The guidelines were initially developed in response to discovery of an alleged plot to sabotage aircraft by assembling an explosive device while in flight; efforts are under way to develop and deploy new technology at airports capable of detecting hazardous substances within LAGs.
3. Progress continues to be made in developing and implementing measures aimed at enhancing the security of travel documents, including last year's dissemination of updated specifications for issuing and reading electronic ID cards used for travel. The sharing of information on all aspects of machine readable travel documents (MRTDs) and border control developments also remains a priority.
4. The ICAO Universal Security Audit Programme (USAP) continues its activities. As of 30 April 2009, audits of 31 Member States and an assessment of the European Commission aviation security inspection system have been completed under the second cycle of the programme, which is focused wherever possible on a State's capability to provide appropriate national oversight of its aviation security activities. The USAP audits have proven instrumental in identifying aviation security concerns and providing recommendations for their resolution. First-cycle audit follow-up missions validate the implementation of State corrective action plans and provide support in remedying deficiencies, and demonstrate a markedly increased level of implementation of ICAO security Standards.
5. Under its Implementation Support and Development (ISD) Programme, ICAO continues to provide Member States with assistance in developing and maintaining a viable and sustainable aviation security system. This support helps to rectify deficiencies that have already been identified under USAP. In 2008, the ISD Programme coordinated or provided direct assistance to 18 States.
6. Participation in the ICAO Aviation Security Point of Contact (PoC) Network, established for the communication of imminent threats to civil aviation, continues to grow. As of 5 May 2009, 94 States had joined the network.

* The full text of the information provided by the International Civil Aviation Organization is available on the website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs (<http://www.un.org/disarmament>). An executive summary was provided for inclusion in the present report.

International Maritime Organization

[Original: English]

[19 May 2009]

1. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) adopted, in 2005, Protocols to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation and to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (the so-called 2005 SUA Protocols). Neither of those Protocols is yet in force. Achieving their expeditious entry into force and global implementation is a major task for IMO in order to advance the fight against international terrorism, and their implementation is referenced in more than one planned output in the Organization's High-Level Action Plan.

2. The status of the 2005 SUA Protocols is as follows:

(a) Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation

- Required number of Parties for entry into force: 12 States
- Number of Signatories: 18
- Number of Contracting States as at 30 April 2009: 8

(b) Protocol of 2005 to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf

1. Required number of Parties for entry into force: three States, with the proviso that it shall not enter into force before the Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation has entered into force
2. Number of Signatories: 18
3. Number of Contracting States as at 30 April 2009: 6.

3. The worldwide acceptance and implementation of the 2005 SUA Protocols has become a major objective within the framework of technical cooperation activities in the field of maritime legislation. In this context, the Sub-Division for Legal Affairs of IMO has organized national seminars in Manila, the Philippines, in Colombo, Sri Lanka, and in Bangkok, Thailand. Other similar technical co-operation activities at national and regional levels are being considered in order to assist developing countries with the incorporation of the 2005 SUA Protocols into their national legislation and the effective implementation of these Treaties, once they have entered into force.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime*

[Original: English]

[20 May 2009]

1. Since 2006, the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has increasingly been giving attention to the issue of nuclear, chemical and biological terrorism, as part of its ongoing technical assistance delivery on counter-terrorism legal and related capacity-building issues.
2. Specialized activities have been organized pursuant to Economic and Social Council resolution 2005/19 and recent General Assembly resolutions, which recognize the role of the Branch in assisting States in ratifying and implementing the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and other recent instruments, including the amendment of 2005 to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material of 1979, the Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation and the Protocol of 2005 to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf.
3. Numerous thematically focused regional workshops have been organized, most recently for States from Central and South-East Europe on international cooperation against terrorism (Budapest, 12-13 November 2008), for member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States and of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (Minsk, 16-18 January 2008) and for member States of the Gulf Council (Doha, 29-30 April 2008) in close cooperation with regional and specialized international organizations, in particular the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and with the participation of specialized bodies, such as the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004).
4. In addition to the regional workshops, the Branch has also been organizing specialized national-level legislative drafting workshops on the criminal law aspects of the universal legal framework against nuclear terrorism (Yerevan, 18-19 February 2009; Dhaka, 6 and 7 May 2008; Kiev, 10-14 March 2008; and Belgrade, 19-20 February 2008) and on the criminal law aspects of the universal legal framework against nuclear, chemical and biological terrorism (Ashgabat, 24-27 November 2008).
5. The Branch has further provided legislative expertise for activities organized by other international and regional organizations, including the International Symposium on Nuclear Security co-organized with IAEA (Vienna, 30 March-3 April 2009); the nuclear security recommendation documents meetings, co-chaired with IAEA (Vienna, 23-27 March 2009 and 17-21 November 2008); the IAEA regional workshop on implementing legislation in nuclear security for African countries (Vienna, 8-10 October 2008); and the meeting on the international legal underpinning for prosecution of illicit transfer of weapons of mass destruction materials and nuclear terrorism, organized by the Global Initiative against Nuclear Terrorism (Garmisch-Partenkirchen, 4 and 5 September 2008). The Branch has lectured at the International School of Nuclear Law (Montpellier, France, 29 August 2008).

* The full text of the information provided by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime is available on the website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs (<http://www.un.org/disarmament>). An executive summary was provided for inclusion in the present report.

B. Other international organizations

Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization

[Original: English]

[29 May 2009]

1. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty prohibits “any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion” and requires States Parties to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under their jurisdiction or control.

2. The Treaty contributes to preventing nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of non-State actors, including terrorists and terrorist networks, by functioning in tandem with other international agreements and measures. With more fissile material in circulation, and more actors handling that material, the Treaty helps strengthen the international legal system to prevent nuclear terrorism, providing a last barrier against nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion. In addition, the capacity-building activities and programmes of the Preparatory Commission contribute to strengthening subregional, regional and international cooperation in this area.

3. A number of States have already brought into force the penal provisions criminalizing the act of carrying out a nuclear explosion or causing, encouraging, preparing for or in any way intentionally participating in such an explosion. Some States, at the time of ratifying the Treaty, amended their penal code with immediate effect. Others had already adopted such legislation as nuclear-weapon-free-zone States. By bringing such legislation into force, the State reduces the likelihood that its territory could become a safe haven for non-State actors, including terrorists and terrorist networks.

4. The Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission carries out a programme of technical assistance through which it provides technical advice and legal assistance to States signatories concerning the legal and administrative measures necessary for implementation of the Treaty, including:

- Conducting regional, subregional or national seminars and workshops dealing in part with national implementation measures. States are encouraged to make use of these events to exchange experiences in national implementation of the Treaty;
- Assisting States signatories in assessing technical needs and the possible approaches, as well as providing comments on eventual draft legislation and support during the internal approval process;
- Maintaining a database of national implementation measures adopted by States Parties. Examples of national legislation and a survey of the texts are available from the Secretariat upon request;
- Preparing documentary information on national implementation measures, which is made available on the public website of the Preparatory Commission (<http://www.ctbto.org/member-states/legal-resources>);
- Cooperating with international organizations and non-governmental organizations in events devoted to the establishment and national implementation of counter-terrorism and non-proliferation measures.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization*

[Original: English]

[25 May 2009]

1. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) policy framework is stipulated in the Alliance's strategic concept of 1999 and, more recently, in the Comprehensive Political Guidance of 2006. In the Comprehensive Political Guidance, NATO member States expressed their concern that terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction were likely to be the principal threats to the Alliance over the next 10-15 years; most dangerously in the case of terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction.

2. In response to those threats, the Alliance will enhance its political efforts to reduce dangers arising from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. In the meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the summit, the Heads of State and Government issued a "Declaration on alliance security", reaffirming that NATO will continue to play its part in reinforcing arms control and promoting nuclear and conventional disarmament. NATO will therefore continue to support existing multilateral non-proliferation agreements. The principal goal of the Alliance and its member States remains to prevent proliferation from occurring or, should it occur, to reverse it through diplomatic means.

3. In April 2009, at the Strasbourg/Kehl summit, NATO Heads of State and Government again condemned all acts of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable and reiterated their determination to fight this scourge, as long as necessary and in accordance with international law and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

4. The Alliance will continue to follow the broad approach to security of the 1999 strategic concept and perform the fundamental security tasks it sets out, namely security, consultation, deterrence and defence, crisis management and partnership.

5. In the light of the new threats, NATO security is increasingly tied to that of other regions. The Alliance continues to provide an essential transatlantic dimension to the global response against terrorism. Allies remain committed to dialogue and cooperation with partners and other international organizations to fight terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and reiterate their determination to protect Allies populations, territories, infrastructure and forces against the consequences of terrorist attacks and the potential use of weapons of mass destruction, especially those including hazards created by the deliberate release of CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear) toxic industrial materials.

* The full text of the information provided by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is available on the website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs (<http://www.un.org/disarmament>). An executive summary was provided for inclusion in the present report.

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe*

[Original: English]

[10 March 2009]

1. In 2008, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) continued to contribute to international efforts in preventing terrorists from acquiring and using weapons of mass destruction and related activities. Although OSCE is not directly engaged in weapons of mass destruction-focused efforts, it promotes and gives technical assistance in implementing Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), inter alia, by developing a best practice guide to prevent individuals and organizations, including terrorist groups, from obtaining and proliferating nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery in the OSCE area. Related activities focus on providing capacity-building assistance in complying with the universal anti-terrorism conventions and protocols, such as the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. These activities predominantly support and promote weapons-of-mass-destruction-specific and other technical assistance provided by other organizations and seek to enhance international cooperation.

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

[Original: English]

[28 May 2009]

1. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, within the clear boundaries of its mandate, continues to contribute to the international community's efforts in the area of counter-terrorism. This has been undertaken both through the promotion of the Chemical Weapons Convention's full implementation, as agreed by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Executive Council (hereinafter "the Council") in 2001 (EC-XXVII/DEC.5, dated 7 December 2001), and in the context of cooperation with the United Nations.

2. The Council has established an Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism, whose task is to examine further how the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons can contribute to global anti-terrorism efforts. The Technical Secretariat (hereinafter "the Secretariat") continues to provide support to the work of the Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism, which remains a key forum for the sharing of information on national and international experiences in counter-terrorism potentially involving weapons of mass destruction — more specifically, chemical weapons. The second special session of the Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter "the Second Review Conference"), which was held from 7 to 18 April 2008, reaffirmed the autonomous and independent status of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and took cognizance of the resolutions of the United Nations on combating terrorism. The Second Review Conference, in this regard, invited States Parties to consult and cooperate both bilaterally and regionally

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on ways to prevent terrorists from acquiring and/or using chemical weapons. The Second Review Conference also took note of the work of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Open-Ended Working Group on Terrorism.

3. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons is encouraged by the explicit recognition of its role in the global anti-terrorism efforts being undertaken by the United Nations, as defined in General Assembly resolution 60/288 on the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

4. On 2 December 2008, the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution 63/48 on the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The resolution stressed that the full and effective implementation of all provisions of the Convention, including those on national implementation (article VII) and assistance and protection (article X), constitutes an important contribution to the efforts of the United Nations in the global fight against terrorism in all its forms and manifestations.

5. Following concerns expressed at both the First and Second Review Conferences that chemical facilities might become subject to attacks or other incidents that could lead to the release or theft of toxic chemicals, the Secretariat encouraged States Parties to exchange experiences and discuss related issues. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons also contributes to enhancing the security of chemical facilities by developing the role of the organization as a platform of support for global cooperation in lessening the chemical threat by promoting awareness of chemical security best practices and by fostering cooperation among professionals in the chemical field.

Organization of American States*

[Original: English]

[31 May 2009]

1. The Organization of American States (OAS) maintains its position on the control of weapons of mass destruction, chemical, biological, radiological agents and non-proliferation, through a number of OAS General Assembly resolutions, commencing with AG/RES. 2298 (XXXVII-O/07) entitled "Consolidation of the regime established in the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco)". More recently, at the thirty-eighth regular session of the OAS General Assembly, in June 2008, the OAS member States clearly articulated support for United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) in AG/RES. 2358 (XXXVIII-O/08), entitled "Support for the implementation at the hemispheric level of United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004)". The resolution calls on member States to take effective steps to comply with the resolution, including, inter alia, reiterating their position on support for Security Council resolution 1540 (2004), urging the OAS Committee on Hemispheric Security to keep this issue on the Committee agenda and requesting the Permanent Council to support these initiatives through the Committee.

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2. OAS remains seized of this issue through its various entities, including the Committee, the primary body which has policymaking authority, and the Secretariat of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism, the leading body with programmatic capabilities on this issue within the Secretariat for Multidimensional Security. Through these and other entities in the organization, OAS has undertaken a variety of activities to facilitate implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) in its member States through collaboration with the key international, regional and subregional stakeholders. These include: the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Stimson Center, key subregional organizations and primary donor countries in the western hemisphere, such as Canada and the United States of America.

3. OAS initiatives, including the meeting of the Committee on Hemispheric Security in Buenos Aires in May 2008 have consistently urged member States to comply with Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and focused on seeking new and innovative methods of compliance. The recent request to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) by the Caribbean Community for technical assistance in implementing Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) in its member States — the first such region-wide request — and the rapid response by donors to this request demonstrate the commitment to compliance with the resolution by OAS, its member States and other key stakeholders. OAS remains committed in its efforts to urge compliance by all its members States.

Pacific Islands Forum secretariat

[Original: English]
[2 March 2009]

1. During 2008, the Pacific Islands Forum secretariat has continued to work with its 16 member countries, 14 of whom are small island developing States, on a range of security and disarmament issues.

2. Nuclear non-proliferation remains important to Forum member countries, and the secretariat has continued its activities in support of the South Pacific nuclear-weapon-free zone, as well as dialogue with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, France and Japan on the safety and security of civil nuclear shipments through the Pacific Ocean. Further, the secretariat has provided practical assistance to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization to convene a regional workshop for Pacific island States held in Apia in May 2008 on ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and its implementation.

3. The Forum secretariat supports members' compliance with international counter-terrorism obligations, including through hosting a United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime counter-terrorism expert at the secretariat, and convening a regional counter-terrorism working group in conjunction with the Government of New Zealand. The workshop is supported by the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, as well as representatives of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and the Expert Group of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). Their attendance ensures that the working group is informed of relevant global counter-

terrorism developments and facilitates an effective dialogue on the availability of technical assistance to give effect to international counter-terrorism requirements.

4. The secretariat also continues to work with members and international partners on other regional priorities, including drafting of security-related legislation, enhancing capacity for border security and strengthening maritime security in the region. The Regional Model Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime bill has also been completed and the Forum secretariat is now working with each Forum island country Attorney-General to adapt the model law to ensure compliance with the legislative priorities of the Nasonini Declaration.

5. The Nasonini Declaration deals with matters pertaining to counter-terrorism, terrorism financing, drug trafficking, weapons control, people smuggling and human trafficking. In 2007, the secretariat completed the Model Law on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime. The Forum secretariat's drafting assistance has been extended to the 14 small island developing State member countries. The adaptation of the Model Law takes the form of a new bill (for those countries that did not have counter-terrorism legislation) or a "gap-filling" bill for those that have counter-terrorism legislation.